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For Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle: How 
the Presumption of Competence Undermines 
Veterans’ Disability Law 
Chase Cobb* 
“To care for him who shall have borne the battle 
and for his widow, and his orphan.” 
 
—The VA Motto 
 
“Honor to the Soldier, and Sailor everywhere, who bravely bears 
his country's cause. Honor also to the citizen who cares for his 
brother in the field, and serves, as he best can, the same cause—
honor to him, only less than to him, who braves, for the common 
good, the storms of heaven and the storms of battle.” 
—Abraham Lincoln 
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I. Introduction 
When the Veterans Administration denies a veteran’s claim 
for disability benefits it often does so based on the opinion of an 
expert medical examiner—usually a doctor or a nurse.1 But under 
a recent federal rule, the VA carries no burden of laying a 
foundation for the expert medical examiner’s opinion—no burden 
of establishing the quality of the expert’s education or the depth of 
her experience; no burden of establishing the scope of the expert’s 
training or the soundness of her reasoning.2 Instead, the VA may 
simply presume the qualifications of its own expert examiner and 
throw the burden on the veteran of offering specific objections.3 If 
the veteran fails to object to the examiner’s qualifications at a 
particular time (at the first stage of the disability review process), 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, M21–1MR, Part 
III, subpart iv, ch. 3, §  A (setting forth VA policy for medical examinations). 
 2. See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the VA need not affirmatively establish the competency of its expert medical 
examiners). 
 3. See id. (requiring that veterans rebut the presumption of competence by 
offering evidence to the contrary). 
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and if the veteran fails to object to the examiner’s qualifications in 
a particular way (specifically rather than generally), the veteran 
loses the right to challenge the examiner’s qualifications on 
appeal.4 
That is a puzzling rule.5 In every other legal context—tort 
cases; contract disputes; murder trials—the burden of qualifying 
an expert falls on the party who wants to admit the expert’s 
testimony.6 In a criminal trial, for example, the burden of 
qualifying a witness for the prosecution falls on the prosecution—
who must then prove the expert’s qualifications through evidence 
of her education, experience, and training.7 But the (so-called) 
“presumption of medical examiner competence” pushes that 
burden in the opposite direction.8 It inexplicably relieves the 
government of its duty of qualifying one particular kind of expert—
VA medical examiners—and it shifts to the veteran a duty not only 
of discovering the expert’s deficiencies but also of expressing these 
deficiencies with a specific objection.9 
That rule would be odd in any legal context but is particularly 
odd as applied to the non-adversarial VA disability program.10 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Even if a veteran objects to an 
examiner’s competence before the Board, a veteran must make a specific objection 
to an examiner’s competence—not merely a general one—before the Board will 
review the examiner’s competence.”). 
 5. See id. at 1353 (criticizing the presumption of competence for the VA’s 
experts in the disability review process in front of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals). 
 6. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion . . . . ”). 
 7. See id. (setting forward the rule for expert witness qualification). 
 8. Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1357–58 (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“Ordinarily, before an expert opinion may be relied upon, the 
expert's competence must be established.”). 
 9. See Parks v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 581, 586 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (treating a 
veteran’s general expression of concern over an examiner’s qualifications as 
insufficient to constitute a formal objection). 
 10. See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Mayer, 
C.J., dissenting) (“The purpose [of the Veterans’ disability program] is to ensure 
that the veteran receives whatever benefits he is entitled to, not to litigate as 
though it were a tort case.”), superseded in part by statute, Pub. L. No. 107-330, 
§  402(a), 116 Stat. 2820, 2832 (2002), as recognized in Maehr v. United States, 
2019 WL 1552562, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2019). 
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That program is described variously by courts as “informal;”11 
“paternalistic;”12 “claimant friendly.”13 The program expressly 
prohibits adversarial burdens such as formal evidentiary 
standards and “a strict adherence [to] the burden of proof.”14 To 
effectuate its non-adversarial purpose, the program puts a duty on 
the Veterans Administration to help veterans develop their claims 
and to weigh all doubts in their favor.15 It would stand to reason, 
then, that the Veterans Administration—in that atmosphere of 
pro-claimant solicitude—would carry a burden of expert 
qualification at least commensurate to that of a litigant in a tort 
case: A burden at least of furnishing enough information about its 
examiners to support appellate review of their qualifications.16 
Instead, the presumption of competence permits the VA to 
withhold all information about its examiners except the most 
basic—their names; their phone numbers; their addresses; so on.17 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011) (“The VA’s 
adjudicatory process is designed to function throughout with a high degree of 
informality and solicitude for the claimant.” (emphasis added) (quoting Walters 
v. Nat’l Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 (1985))). 
 12. See Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Gajarsa, J., 
dissenting) (describing the VA’s interest in protecting the veteran as 
“paternalistic”). 
 13. See Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Congressional 
mandate requires that the VA operate a unique system of processing and 
adjudicating claims for benefits that is both claimant friendly and 
non-adversarial. An integral part of this system is embodied in the VA's duty to 
assist the veteran in developing facts pertinent to his or her claim.”). 
 14. H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 
5795. 
 15. See 38 U.S.C. §  5107(b) (2000) (“When there is an approximate balance 
of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the 
determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the 
claimant.”); see also Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(describing the VA’s duty to “sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to its 
optimum.”) (citations omitted). 
 16. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Reyna, J., concurring) (advocating that the presumption of competence be 
overturned). 
 17. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Hughes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Every examination 
report or Disability Benefits Questionnaire (DBQ) must contain the signature, 
printed name and credentials, phone number and preferably a fax number, 
medical license number, and address of the examiner, as well as his or her 
specialty, if a specialist examination is required.”) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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Although veterans may ask for more information, the VA will often 
refuse to hand the information over until an appellate court orders 
them to do so.18 And by refusing to hand over the information, the 
VA puts the veterans in a double bind: It withholds from the 
veterans exactly the information that they need to raise a specific 
objection until it is too late for them to raise one.19 That double 
bind is just one way—of the many discussed in this note—that the 
presumption of competence insulates the veterans’ disability 
program from meaningful judicial review.20 
Even several members of the court that created the 
presumption—the Federal Circuit—have dedicated themselves to 
overturning it.21 One judge in particular—the Honorable Jimmie 
Reyna—has written two separate opinions (one a concurrence, the 
other a dissent) challenging the presumption.22 In these opinions, 
he not only proves the illegitimacy of the presumption but also 
offers a straightforward method of eliminating it.23 He advocates 
that the court put on the Veterans Administration the same 
evidentiary burden that belongs to a litigant in a tort case: The 
burden of laying a foundation for its own expert witnesses.24 
Because that approach is sensible, this note advocates that the 
Federal Circuit adopt it. 
The roadmap for the Note is as follows: First, it tells how the 
presumption came to exist; second, it tells what consequences the 
presumption has wrought; third, it tells about the split at the 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. at 1357 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“If a veteran asks for an examiner’s qualifications, the VA will not provide them 
unless it is ordered to do so by the Board, the Veterans Court, or this court.”). 
 19. See id. (“The veteran is rendered hapless, caught in a classic Joseph 
Heller catch-22-like circumstance.”). 
 20. See id. (explaining that the presumption of competence “almost entirely 
insulates the VA’s choice of medical examiners from review”). 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 1353 (admonishing the court to overturn the presumption 
of competence). 
 22. See id. (challenging the presumption); see also Mathis v. McDonald, 643 
Fed. Appx. 968, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., concurring) (same). 
 23. See Mathis, 643 Fed. Appx. at 975 (Reyna, J., concurring) (suggesting the 
court replace its presumption of competence with a more sensible rule). 
 24. See id. (“Eliminating the presumption will require the VA to provide the 
Board with evidence that an examiner is qualified through education, training, 
or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions on the issue that 
the examiner is testifying about.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Federal Circuit; and fourth, it tells about a solution to the 
presumption of competence. 
II. The Story 
A. Congress Creates a Non-Adversarial Disability Scheme. 
The veterans’ disability program is a kind of bureaucratic 
utopia where veterans may seek disability benefits without the 
help of lawyers.25 The program in fact discourages lawyers from 
even participating by capping the fees that they may charge 
veterans at the earliest stages of disability claims.26 After the 
earliest stages, the program allows paid representation but treats 
represented veterans differently from unrepresented ones, 
affording to latter greater protections.27 Unsurprisingly, many 
veterans pursue their claims as the program encourages them to: 
Pro se.28 
Because many veterans pursue their claims pro se, they often 
arrive at their disability hearings unprepared to argue the nuances 
of the law; unprepared to overcome procedural objections and to 
cross-examine witnesses—they come unprepared to argue their 
                                                                                                     
 25. See Steven Reiss & Matthew Tenner, Effects of Representation by 
Attorneys in Cases Before VA: The “New Paternalism”, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 2, 2–3 
(2009) (noting the pro-claimant and non-adversarial nature of the veterans’ 
disability program). 
 26. See id. at 3 n.10 (stating that lawyers often forbear representing clients 
at earliest stages of disability claims due to the statutory fee cap); see also 38 
C.F.R. §  14.636 (2019) (providing that attorney’s fees in VA proceedings must be 
reasonable). 
 27. See Reiss & Tenner, supra note 25, at 47–48 (stating that the veterans’ 
courts deal more paternalistically with unrepresented veterans than represented 
ones). 
 28. See id. at 2–3 (noting that claims are usually filed pro se and describing 
how pro se claims fare at the later stages of disability claims as compared to 
represented claims); see also Frequently Asked Questions: The Veterans 
Consortium Pro Bono Program, VETERANS CONSORTIUM, 
https://www.vetsprobono.org/helpavet/item.7653-
Attorney_Training_Brochure_FAQs#thirteen (last visited Mar. 2, 2019) (listing 
“some of the reasons that many veterans remain unrepresented at the time they 
file their appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims”) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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cases as real lawyers would argue them.29 But that is okay.30 The 
disability program accounts for the non-adversarial nature of its 
proceedings by removing all adversarial burdens: Burdens such as 
“cross examination, [the] best evidence rule, [the] hearsay evidence 
exclusion, or [a] strict adherence to burden of proof.”31 Instead, the 
program puts an affirmative duty on the VA—the VA being here 
the theoretically adverse party—to actually help veterans develop 
their claims and to weigh all doubts in their favor.32 After all: “The 
government's interest in veterans cases is not that it shall win, but 
rather that justice shall be done . . . .”33 
Perhaps the most salient feature of the veterans’ disability 
program is the relaxed way that it allows veterans to establish a 
link between their past services and their present disabilities.34 
Unlike other disability programs—where the claimant must show 
not only the existence of a present disability but also the 
connection between that disability and her earlier work—the 
veterans’ program disregards the question of causality 
altogether.35 It instead considers only a simple “temporal” 
                                                                                                     
 29. See id. at 47–48 (clarifying that the veterans’ courts compensate for the 
veterans’ lack of legal sophistication by affording them more paternalistic 
proceedings). 
 30. See Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affording 
pro se veterans a “liberal and sympathetic reading of” the record). 
 31. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13 (1988). But see Reiss & Tenner, supra 
note 25, at 47–48 (noting that the Congress has somewhat amended the veterans’ 
disability statutes since the 1980’s). 
 32. See 38 U.S.C. §  5107(b) (2018) (“When there is an approximate balance 
of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the 
determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the 
claimant.”); see also Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(describing the VA’s duty to “sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to its 
optimum.” (citations omitted)). 
 33. Comer, 552 F.3d at 1369 (citations omitted). 
 34. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13 (1988) (“Congress has designed . . . a 
beneficial non-adversarial system of veterans benefits. This is particularly true of 
service-connected disability compensation where the element of cause and effect 
has been totally by passed in favor of a simple temporal relationship between the 
incurrence of the disability and the period of active duty.”). 
 35. Compare Eligibility for Disability Benefits, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., 
https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (detailing 
eligibility requirements for disability benefits) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice), with Benefits Planner: How You Qualify, 
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/planners/disability/qualify.html (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2019) (detailing eligibility requirements for Social Security 
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question: Did the veteran’s disability arise during the time of 
service?36 If the answer to that question is yes, the veteran is 
entitled to benefits no matter the cause (with exceptions).37 
But under the relaxed service-connection standard, a common 
problem arises.38 What happens when the origin of a veteran’s 
disability is unclear? What happens, for example, when a veteran 
is diagnosed with a complex neurological condition thirty years 
into his retirement and has no idea when the condition began: 
During service or after?  
In cases such as that one, the role of the VA medical examiner 
becomes particularly important.39 The VA medical examiner—
usually a doctor or a nurse—will evaluate the veteran’s disability 
claim (either by personally examining him or by simply reviewing 
his file) and then offer a professional opinion about when the 
veteran’s disability began.40 On the basis of that opinion, the VA 
will then decide whether to award the veteran benefits.41 In the 
event that the veteran disagrees with the VA’s decision, she has 
the right to appeal the decision according to the following 
hierarchy: She may appeal first to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 
and from there to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United States.42 
In the ways that matter, the job of the VA medical examiner 
matches that of an expert witness at trial.43 Both give professional 
                                                                                                     
disability benefits) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 36. See H.R. REP NO. 100-963 (examining the question that must be asked in 
order to determine disability eligibility). 
 37. See U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., supra note 375 (detailing eligibility 
requirements for disability benefits). 
 38. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (deciding 
in 2009 a case about a veteran whose disability arose decades earlier). 
 39. See 38 U.S.C. §  5103A(d) (2018) (setting on the VA a duty to provide 
veterans’ medical examinations so as to decide whether veterans qualify for 
disability benefits). 
 40. See VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, M21–1MR, pt. III, subpart 
iv, ch. 3, §  A(6) (setting forth VA policy for medical examinations). 
 41. See 38 U.S.C. §  5103A(d) (2018) (describing the role of the VA medical 
examiner in assisting the VA decide disability claims). 
 42. See James D. Ridgeway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years 
Later, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 251, 257 (2010) (laying out the multiple layers 
of judicial review). 
 43. See Townsend v. Shinseki, No. 12-0507, 2013 WL 2152126, at *5 (Vet. 
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opinions on sophisticated topics; the opinions of both influence the 
legal rights of real people.44 Given the similarities between the two 
positions, it would stand to reason that the rules governing one 
should apply with equal force to the other.45 Consider, for example, 
that foundational rule of expert testimony: That the burden of 
qualifying an expert rests with the party who wants to admit the 
expert’s testimony.46 That rules serves at least two important 
purposes. First, it ensures that only true experts may give expert 
opinions to the jury; and second, it furnishes to the appellate record 
enough information to support a review of the expert’s opinion on 
appeal.47  
Both of these rationales hold true even more in the veterans’ 
disability context than they do in the trial context.48 The veterans’ 
disability program, after all, is a supposedly non-adversarial affair 
organized in the veteran’s favor.49 It confers on the veteran every 
possible advantage and the benefit of every doubt.50 Within that 
                                                                                                     
App. May 20, 2013) (stating that VA medical examiners are “’nothing more or less 
than expert witnesses’ who provide opinions on medical matters” (quoting 
Nieves- Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 302 (2008))). 
 44. See Expert Witness, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A witness 
qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide a 
scientific, technical, or other specialized opinion about the evidence or a fact 
issue.”). 
 45. See Townsend, 2013 WL 2152126, at *5 (noting the similarities between 
the two positions). 
 46. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion . . . .”). 
 47. See Expert Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting that 
to the extent an expert opinion is backed by education, training, and experience, 
it can help a trier of fact arrive at a decision on a sophisticated topic). 
 48. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing) (advocating that veterans’ 
medical examiners be held to a standard similar to that of Rule 702). 
 49. See Hayre v. W., 188 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Congressional 
mandate requires that the VA operate a unique system of processing and 
adjudicating claims for benefits that is both claimant friendly and 
non-adversarial. An integral part of this system is embodied in the VA's duty to 
assist the veteran in developing facts pertinent to his or her claim.”). 
 50. See 38 U.S.C §  5107(b) (2018) (“When there is an approximate balance 
of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the 
determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the 
claimant.”); see also Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011) (describing 
the VA disability program as one “designed to function . . . with a high degree of 
586 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 577 (2019) 
program, it stands to reason that the VA should carry a burden of 
expert qualification at least equal to that of a litigant in a tort 
trial.51 
But for reasons that defy comprehension, the VA does not 
carry that burden.52 The burden instead rests on the veteran to 
affirmatively object to her examiner’s qualifications—to discover 
on her own initiative the deficiencies of her examiner’s education 
and experience and communicate these deficiencies as a specific 
objection.53 Veterans carry that burden because ten years ago the 
Federal Circuit, with a hollow ruling, entitled the veterans’ 
medical examiners to a presumption of competence.54 The 
explanation as to how that rule came to exist begins with the sad 
story of a veteran named David Rizzo.55  
B. The Federal Circuit Adds to The Non-Adversarial Disability 
Scheme an Adversarial Burden. 
During one year of service in late 1940’s, veteran David Rizzo 
traveled three times to the Marshall Islands Bikini Atoll as part of 
a radiation monitoring effort.56 The army had set off twenty-three 
nuclear bombs there, and he was part of the clean-up team.57 Rizzo 
                                                                                                     
informality and solicitude for the claimant.”) (citations omitted). 
 51. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1357 (en banc) (Reyna, J., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing) (“Ordinarily, before an expert opinion may be relied upon, the 
expert's competence must be established.”). 
 52. See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the VA need not affirmatively establish the competency of its expert medical 
examiners). 
 53. See id. (assuming a medical examiner’s competency in the absence of a 
formal objection from the veteran). 
 54. See id. (“[T]his court holds that VA need not affirmatively establish that 
expert's competency.”). 
 55. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the life story of David Rizzo that 
led to the case in question). 
 56. See Rizzo, 580 F.3d at 1289 (talking about the number of times David 
Rizzo traveled to the Bikini Atoll as part of his military service). 
 57. See Brief for Appellant at A24, Rizzo v. Peake, No. 2009-7026 (Fed. Cir. 
Feb. 3, 2009) (describing the job David Rizzo held on Bikini Atoll). See generally 
Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Bikini-atoll-Marshall-Islands (last visited Jan. 
20, 2019) (telling the history of the islands) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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testified before an administrative board that his job on the islands 
was to shovel radioactive soil into crates; then when he had filled 
the crates, he would help load them on an airplane and then unload 
them somewhere else.58 He said that he was exposed to radiation 
from moving the radioactive topsoil, swimming in radioactive 
water, inhaling radioactive dust, eating radioactive foods, and 
drinking radioactive water.59 In the mid-1980’s, he began losing his 
vision from cataracts and other eye diseases and sought 
treatment.60 According to one heartbreaking line in his appellate 
record, he visited a hospital and “was given a white cane and 
instructions on how to cook at home.”61 
He filed a claim for disability benefits.62 To support his claim, 
he presented not only some evidence but a great deal of evidence 
to show a link between his vision problems and the work that he 
did on the islands.63 Notably, he presented the testimony of an 
atomic physicist with four degrees including a Doctorate in 
Radiation Physics and Radioecology.64 That physicist also had 
twenty-years’ experience in the field and had spent the last six of 
those years as lead investigator on a number of studies assessing 
the radiological conditions at the Marshall Islands.65 The physicist 
testified that a large concentration of radiation obtained over the 
area where Rizzo dug topsoil and that his moving of radioactive 
crates for hours at a time exposed Rizzo to a “potentially high dose” 
of radiation.66 He testified that the radiation probably caused 
Rizzo’s eye problems.67 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. at A24 (detailing the tasks David Rizzo was assigned on the 
island). 
 59. See id. at A13 (discussing the interaction David Rizzo had with the 
radioactive landscape on Bikini Atoll). 
 60. See Rizzo, 580 F.3d at 1289 (describing the symptoms that Davis Rizzo 
began to feel forty years after his military service). 
 61. See Brief for Appellant at A23, Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 62. See Rizzo, 580 F.3d at 1289. 
 63. See Brief for Appellant at 8–9, Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (summing up Rizzo’s evidence). 
 64. See id. at A29–41 (detailing the expert’s qualifications). 
 65. See id. (describing the expert’s field experience). 
 66. See id. at A4–A5 (describing the likely source of radiation exposure). 
 67. See id. at A25 (“So my testimony will try to establish today with a certain 
degree of high probability that Mr. Rizzo was exposed to doses of radiation that 
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In response to the testimony of the atomic physicist, the VA 
heard testimony from another expert.68 This expert was a VA 
doctor who served at the time as an undersecretary for the agency 
but whose qualifications to opine on radiation-linked diseases were 
unknown.69 He came to the opposite conclusion as the atomic 
physicist: That the radiation on the islands probably did not cause 
Rizzo’s eye diseases.70 The expert based his opinion on government 
reports and academic findings without personally examining 
Mathis.71 
Although both experts were at least somewhat qualified to 
assess Rizzo’s health, there is no question as to who was the more 
qualified: The physicist.72 Had both experts testified before a jury, 
the jury would have—it is a virtual certainty—afforded greater 
weight to that expert and granted Rizzo’s benefits.73 And given 
that Rizzo probably could have won his case in the adversarial 
world of civil lawsuit, it stands to reason that he should even more 
easily have won his suit in the non-adversarial world of the VA 
disability scheme—the principle of greater-to-lesser reasoning 
pretty-well dictating that outcome.74 
But for reasons not abundantly clear, Rizzo lost his case at the 
VA.75 He appealed to the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit.76 
Notably, neither appellate court weighed the credentials of the two 
                                                                                                     
caused these cataracts.”). 
 68. See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing 
the testimony of the opposing witness). 
 69. See Brief for Appellant at 9–10, A42, Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (summing up the witness’s qualifications and noting the absence 
of any qualifications to state an opinion on radiation-induced diseases).  
 70. See Rizzo, 580 F.3d at 1289 (summarizing the expert’s conclusion). 
 71. See Brief for Appellant at A27–28, Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (setting forth the expert’s opinion). 
 72. See id. at 7–9 (comparing the qualifications of the two experts). 
 73. See id. (comparing the qualifications of the two experts). 
 74. See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting) (“The purpose [of the Veterans’ disability program] is to ensure that 
the veteran receives whatever benefits he is entitled to, not to litigate as though 
it were a tort case.”), superseded in part by statute, Pub. L. No. 107-330, §  402(a), 
116 Stat. 2820, 2832 (2002), as recognized in Maehr v. United States, 2019 WL 
1552562, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2019). 
 75. See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (delivering 
the procedural history). 
 76. See id. at 1290 (describing the process that Rizzo pursued to seek relief). 
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experts against each other.77 Instead, both courts entitled the VA 
to a presumption that it had picked a competent examiner and 
deferred to its decision.78 The Federal Circuit included in its 
opinion only sparse authority to support the presumption of 
medical examiner competence.79 Here is a paragraph summarizing 
the court’s holding:  
Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert, this court 
perceives no statutory or other requirement that that the VA 
must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s 
qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s 
reliance upon that physician’s opinion. Indeed, whereas here, 
the veteran does not challenge a VA medical expert’s 
competence or qualifications before the Board, this court holds 
that VA need not affirmatively establish that expert’s 
competency.80 
Stated differently, the court held flatly that what is true for 
civil litigants at trial is not true for the VA in the disability 
program: The agency carries no burden of laying a foundation for 
the testimony of its own experts.81 To support that decision, the 
court offered practically no reasoning and made reference to only 
a handful of cases.82 Of the cases the court referenced, none 
actually supported a presumption of medical examiner 
competence.83 Instead, the cases supported a different 
presumption—one known as the presumption of regularity.84 That 
                                                                                                     
 77. See id. at 1291 (adopting from the Veterans Court a presumption of 
medical examiner competence). 
 78. See id. (“[T]his court holds that VA need not affirmatively establish that 
expert’s competency.”). 
 79. See id. (building the presumption of competence on a shaky foundation). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The presumption, that the 
Veterans Administration ordinarily and routinely selects competent medical 
examiners as a matter of due course, was created void of any evidentiary basis.”). 
 82. See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (adopting 
the presumption of competence without putting forward evidence that medical 
examiners are routinely competent). 
 83. See id. (referencing cases about a different administrative 
presumption—the presumption of regularity—without giving reasons why that 
presumption should apply here). 
 84. See id. (using the presumption of regularity to support the presumption 
of competence). 
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presumption is an obscure administrative rule and an odd fit to 
veterans’ medical examinations.85 Because it forms the (rather 
tremulous) foundation of this Note’s topic, it is worth taking a 
moment to ask the obvious question: What does it even do? 
C. The Adversarial Burden Turns the Non-Adversarial Scheme 
Inside out. 
The presumption of regularity does a straightforward thing 
most easily explained by an example.86 Suppose that someone 
(Janice) has a job shipping important government notices to people 
across the country. She folds each day the important government 
notices into hundreds of prefect trifolds and sends them off in 
envelopes bearing the insignias of impressive-sounding 
government agencies: FBI, DOJ, DOE, so on. And then suppose 
that one day, one of Janice’s notices (addressed to Steve) goes 
missing—either lost in the mail or stolen by malicious postal 
bandits. Steve is understandably upset about the mishap. Steve 
depended on the notice to do something important, like file an 
appeal or claim benefits. But now Steve has missed his deadline. 
Steve wants the deadline extended on the theory that his missing 
it was Janice’s fault, not his. He takes his case first to an 
administrative review board but having no luck there resorts to a 
federal appeal.  
The question is how does the appeals court determine what 
actually happened to the notice. It can of course demand proof from 
Janice that she sent the notice properly; that she put the right 
address on it and attached adequate postage. But given that Janice 
sends hundreds of these notices a day, it is doubtful that she can 
muster that kind of evidence—she probably cannot even remember 
sending this particular notice in the first place. But does that mean 
that the blame falls on Janice by default? If so, does that not create 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting) (“[E]very case applying the presumption of regularity . . . [has] 
something in common: [A]ctions taken or documents produced within a process 
that is generally reliable because it is, for example, transparent, accessible, and 
often familiar.”). 
 86. See Crain v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 182, 186 (Vet. App. 2003) (“[T]he law 
presumes the regularity of the administrative process ‘in the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary.”) (citations omitted). 
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a rather huge problem? Can notice-recipients all across the country 
escape their deadlines by simply pointing the finger at Janice? Do 
the floodgates now open on frivolous administrative appeals?  
Thankfully, the presumption of regularity keeps the 
floodgates shut.87 It allows Janice (and the agency Janice works 
for) to prove that she sent one notice reliably by proving simply 
that she generally sends her notices reliably.88 In other words, it 
allows Janice to prove the reliability of her process rather than the 
reliability of her one particular action.89 Applied to these facts, it 
would allow Janice to prove the consistency of her mailing 
procedure by presenting evidence of the procedure’s manifold 
safeguards; of its astonishingly low error rate—so on.90 Based on 
that evidence, the court could then conclude that Janice in fact sent 
the notice to Steve.91 
The presumption of regularity makes good sense applied to 
administrative procedures such as the mail.92 The consequences of 
negligent mailing are generally low; the burden of litigating every 
negligently mailed letter would be fairly high.93 The mail is a 
consistent, reliable—entirely “non-discretionary”—kind of 
procedure.94 But to the degree that the presumption makes sense 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The 
presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the 
contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged 
their official duties.”). 
 88. See, e.g., id. (applying the presumption of regularity to a mailing 
procedure). 
 89. See id. (“We perceive no legal basis for holding that the presumption of 
regularity may not be employed to establish, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, that certain ministerial steps were taken in accordance with the 
requirements of law.”). 
 90. See Posey v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 406, 410 (Vet. App. 2010) (noting that 
at its “root,” the presumption of reliability applies to government jobs that are 
“the product[s] of a consistent, reliable procedure”). 
 91. See Crain v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 182, 186 (Vet. App. 2003) (“[T]he law 
presumes the regularity of the administrative process ‘in the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary.”) (citations omitted). 
 92. See Miley, 366 F.3d at 1347 (comparing the application of the 
presumption of regularity to a mailing procedure with its application to 
administrative processes).  
 93. See Crain, 17 Vet. App. at 186 (explaining that presumption of regularity 
applies to generally reliable administrative processes). 
 94. See Nondiscretionary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/procedure (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (“[N]ot left to 
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as applied to the mail it proves equally foolish as applied to 
veterans’ medical examinations.95 Medical examinations are 
emphatically not like the mail.96 They are not procedural, and they 
are not non-discretionary.97 They are in fact the opposite of 
non- discretionary—they are about as discretionary as a job can 
be.98 The whole point of the job is to make determinations; to 
exercise judgment over who qualifies for benefits and who does 
not.99 Whereas the action of sending a letter is automatic, almost 
mechanical—similar to a “habit” under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence100—the action of performing a medical examination is 
deliberate and nuanced and even under the best of circumstances 
                                                                                                     
discretion or exercised at one's own discretion.”) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Procedure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/procedure (last visited Jan. 20, 
2019) (“[A] series of steps followed in a regular definite order.”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 95. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the presumption of 
regularity should not apply to veterans’ medical evaluations). 
 96. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
presumption should be predicated on evidence that gives us confidence that a 
particular procedure is carried out properly and yields reliable results in the 
ordinary course.”). 
 97. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he presumption of regularity has 
is only typically been only applied to routine, non-discretionary, and ministerial 
procedures.”). 
 98. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA ADJUDICATION 




(describing the role of the medical examiner in deciding veterans’ disability 
claims) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice).  
 99. See, e.g., Parks v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 581, 586 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (deferring 
to a nurse’s decision that a veteran did not qualify for disability benefits). 
 100. See FED. R. EVID. 406 (allowing admission at trial certain evidence of a 
habit or act which becomes a “semi-automatic” response or a “regular practice” in 
light of specific conduct or stimuli). 
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subject to error.101 It should not be entitled to a presumption of 
regularity.102 
The Federal Circuit’s own reasoning supports this 
conclusion.103 In a decision called Kyhn v. Shinseki, the court 
refused to extend the presumption to a particular government 
procedure because the lower courts had failed to properly establish 
the reliability of the procedure.104 Interestingly, the government 
procedure in that case actually did involve sending a letter.105 More 
interestingly, the particular letter was one that notified a veteran 
of—get this—his right to a medical examination.106 This is an 
astounding decision. As things apparently stand, the Federal 
Circuit will presume the regularity of medical examinations 
themselves—but will not presume the regularity of letters that 
notify veterans of those medical examinations.107  
The Federal Circuit contravened its own case law in crafting 
the presumption of medical examiner competence.108 Were that its 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Sarah Kolinovsky, VA Admits 25,000 Veterans Received Improper 
Brain Injury Screening, ABC NEWS (2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/va-admits-
25000-veterans-received-improper-brain-injury/story?id=39734423 (reporting 
that over the course of seven years, unqualified or non-certified VA medical 
perform examiners professionals performed over 24,000 traumatic brain exams 
injury exams) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 102. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1355 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (admonishing the court for applying the presumption of 
regularity to medical examinations, as medical examinations are not “routine, 
ministerial procedure[s]”). 
 103. See Kyhn v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 572 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (refusing to extend 
the presumption of regularity to a procedure whose reliability had not been 
properly established). 
 104. See id. at 575–78 (concluding that the lower court—the Veterans Court—
had improperly used evidence not in the record to support its finding of 
regularity). 
 105. See id. at 574 (describing the letter). 
 106. See id. (“To determine whether the presumption of regularity applied, 
the Veterans Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs . . . to provide the court with ‘information concerning the regular process 
by which VA notifies veterans of scheduled VA examinations.’”). 
 107. Compare id. at 575–78 (refusing to apply the presumption of regularity 
to examination notification letters), with Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291–
92 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying the presumption of regularity to medical 
examinations). 
 108. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (admonishing the court for applying 
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only flaw, the presumption perhaps could be forgiven. But 
unfortunately, the precedential problems only scratch the surface.  
III. The Consequence 
After Rizzo, a vicious pattern emerged.109 Veterans across the 
country would file claims for disability benefits, just as Rizzo had 
done, and would receive medical evaluations from the expert VA 
examiners.110 The examiners would then deny the veterans’ claims, 
just as they had done to Rizzo, without delivering extensive 
analysis and without providing their qualifications111—instead 
providing only their names, phone numbers, and other basic 
information.112 Veterans would then appeal their decision but 
would lose after a lengthy fight, often spanning many years.113 
That cycle has produced a number of serious consequences.114 It is 
worth taking a moment to catalog them here.  
                                                                                                     
the presumption of regularity to medical examinations, as medical examinations 
are not “routine, ministerial procedure[s]”). 
 109. See id. at 1357 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(arguing that the presumption of competence would shield the VA disability 
program from judicial review). 
 110. See, e.g., Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(finding that the VA appropriately relied on its own medical examiner although 
it had not affirmatively established the examiner’s credentials). 
 111. See, e.g., Sickels v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t 
should be clear from our logic that the Board is . . . not mandated . . . to give 
reasons and bases for concluding that a medical examiner is competent unless the 
issue is raised by the veteran.”) (citations omitted). 
 112. See Mathis, 834 F.3d 1347 at 1351–52 (Hughes, J., concurring in the 
denial of rehearing en banc) (“Every examination report or Disability Benefits 
Questionnaire (DBQ) must contain the ‘signature, printed name and credentials, 
phone number and preferably a fax number, medical license number, and address’ 
of the examiner, as well as his or her specialty, if a specialist examination is 
required.”) (citations omitted). 
 113. See, e.g., Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(affirming the denial of a veteran’s disability benefits after a years-long appeal 
process). 
 114. See id. at 976–86 (Reyna, J., concurring) (presenting the consequences of 
the presumption of competence). 
FOR HIM WHO SHALL HAVE BORNE THE BATTLE 595 
A. The Presumption of Competence Shields the Veterans’ 
Disability Program from Judicial Review.  
Veterans can overcome the presumption of competence in only 
one way: By raising specific objections against their examiners’ 
qualifications at the first stage of the administrative appeals 
process—before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.115 But for three 
reasons—one of them obvious, the other two less so—veterans 
often fail to clear that hurdle.116  
The obvious reason that veterans do not clear that hurdle is 
that they do not know how to clear it.117 They are not professionally 
trained lawyers, and they do not know the intricacies of civil 
procedure.118 They either fail to object at all or fail to object with 
the requisite degree of specificity.119 And because veterans often 
forbear hiring counsel120—because the disability program itself 
discourages representation121—they often do not have assistance 
in navigating this obscure requirement.122 The veterans fall victim 
                                                                                                     
 115. See Mathis, 834 F.3d 1347 at 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Even if a veteran objects to an examiner’s 
competence before the Board, a veteran must make a ‘specific’ objection to an 
examiner’s competence—not merely a ‘general’ one—before the Board will review 
the examiner’s competence.”). 
 116. See id. (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(explaining that the presumption of competence “almost entirely insulates the 
VA’s choice of medical examiners from review”). 
 117. See Steven Reiss & Matthew Tenner, Effects of Representation by 
Attorneys in Cases Before VA, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 2, 2–3 (2009) [hereinafter Reiss] 
(noting the pro-claimant and non-adversarial nature of the of the veterans’ 
disability program). 
 118. See id. at 47–48 (stating that the veterans’ courts compensate for the 
veterans’ lack of legal sophistication by affording them more paternalistic 
proceedings). 
 119. See, e.g., Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A 
request for information about an expert’s qualifications, however, is not the same 
as a challenge to those qualifications. Indeed, one may assume that litigants who 
are told an expert witness’s qualifications frequently may conclude that there is 
no reasonable basis for challenging those qualifications.”). 
 120. See Reiss, supra note 117, at 3 n.10 (stating that lawyers often forbear 
representing clients at the earliest stages of disability claims due to statutory fee 
caps). 
 121. See id. at 47–48 (stating that the veterans’ courts deal more 
paternalistically with unrepresented veterans than represented ones). 
 122. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(considering the appeal of a pro se veteran). 
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to the very aspect of the benefits program that is supposed to be 
working in their favor: Its informality.123  
The second reason that veterans do not offer specific objections 
is that the Federal Circuit has failed to explain what objecting 
specifically even means.124 In one case, for example, a veteran 
expressed to the VA a general concern that his medical examiner—
a nurse—was unqualified to perform his evaluation.125 On appeal, 
he tried to raise the issue of his examiner’s qualifications— 
namely, that the nurse was unqualified to diagnose his particular 
disability.126 But apparently the veteran’s general expression of 
concern did not rise to the level of a formal objection—perhaps he 
needed to use certain magic words.127 Whatever the requirement, 
it seems out of place in the non-adversarial veterans’ disability 
program, especially since that program expressly prohibits formal, 
adversarial-style burdens.128 
The last reason that veterans fail to win their objections is the 
most disturbing: Even when a veteran does try to object to her 
examiner’s qualifications, she is often barred from doing so.129 She 
                                                                                                     
 123. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011) (describing the VA 
disability program as one “designed to function . . . with a high degree of 
informality and solicitude for the claimant.”) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 124. See Parks v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 581, 586 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying the 
presumption of competence although the veteran raised a general expression of 
concern as to his examiner’s qualifications before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals).  
 125. See id. at 586 (“[A]t the Board and with the assistance of a non-lawyer 
from the DAV, Mr. Parks had asserted only that the report prepared by Ms. 
Larson should have been excluded because, contrary to VA operating procedures, 
a physician had not signed it.”). 
 126. See id. (“Mr. Parks never raised any concern over Ms. Larson’s 
qualification or those of an ARNP generally, let alone sought to overcome the 
presumption until his appeal to the Veterans Court.”). 
 127. See id. at 585–86 (holding that the veteran had waived his objection by 
failing to argue that the VA’s selection of the examiner was improper or that Ms. 
Larson was incompetent). 
 128. See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting) (“The purpose [of the Veterans’ disability program] is to ensure that 
the veteran receives whatever benefits he is entitled to, not to litigate as though 
it were a tort case.”), superseded in part by statute, Pub. L. No. 107-330, §  402(a), 
116 Stat. 2820, 2832 (2002), as recognized in Maehr v. United States, 2019 WL 
1552562, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2019). 
 129. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining how the VA sometimes 
bars veterans from even raising objections against their examiners’ 
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is barred because the VA often will simply refuse to give the 
veteran enough information to raise a specific objection, putting 
her in a double bind:  
If a veteran asks for an examiner’s qualifications, the VA will 
not provide them unless it is ordered to do so by the Board, the 
Veterans Court, or this court. The Board may refuse to order 
the VA to do so when the veteran has not already raised a 
specific objection to the examiner’s competence. This can create 
a situation in which the veteran must make a specific objection 
to an examiner’s competence before she can learn the 
examiner’s qualifications; otherwise, the Veterans Court and 
this court will deny a veteran’s challenge to the competency of 
the examiner. The veteran is rendered hapless, caught in a 
classic Joseph Heller catch-22-like circumstance.130  
That the VA may place the burden of challenging an 
examiner’s competence on the veteran himself, and then not give 
the veteran enough information to actually raise a challenge, is one 
of the presumption of competence’s most troubling aspects, 
according to Justice Gorsuch: 
[C]onsider how the presumption works in practice. The VA 
usually refuses to supply information that might allow a 
veteran to challenge the presumption without an order from the 
Board of Veterans’ Appeals. And that Board often won’t issue 
an order unless the veteran can first supply a specific reason for 
thinking the examiner incompetent. No doubt this arrangement 
makes the VA’s job easier. But how is it that an administrative 
agency may manufacture for itself or win from the courts a 
regime that has no basis in the relevant statutes and does 
nothing to assist, and much to impair, the interests of those the 
law says the agency is supposed to serve?131 
Imagine going to court and the judge putting the burden on 
you to discredit the other side’s expert witness—a formidable 
obstacle in itself. But then imagine that you ask the other side: 
Well, who exactly is your witness—and they refuse to tell you. And 
                                                                                                     
qualifications); see also No. 1452787, 2014 WL 7740599, at *8 (Bd. Vet. App. Dec. 
1, 2014) (refusing a veteran’s request for access to her examiner’s CV because the 
veteran had not rebutted the presumption of competence). 
 130. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted). 
 131. Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994, 1995 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari). 
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then imagine that the judge allows the expert to deliver withering 
testimony against your case, his qualifications totally 
unestablished. Imagine that all of this happens in a theoretically 
solicitous disability scheme that is supposedly oriented in you 
favor. Imagine all of this, and you have imagined the presumption 
of competence.132 
This presumption shields the veterans’ disability program 
from judicial review.133 After all, if a veteran cannot object to his 
examiner’s opinion, how can the veteran appeal the examiner’s 
opinion?134 Even when a veteran can appeal his examiner’s 
opinion, the presumption of competence still prevents an effective 
review by limiting the information that comes before the appeals 
court.135 That is especially true when you consider that in some of 
its more recent decisions, the Federal Circuit has extended the 
presumption beyond the mere question of the examiner’s 
qualifications all the way to the examiner’s reasoning itself—
assuming not only the competence of the examiner but also the 
competence of his opinion.136 That presumption might be 
warranted if evidence proved the general reliability of medical 
examiners. Unfortunately, the evidence shows the opposite.137  
                                                                                                     
 132. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Reyna, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (describing the struggles experienced by veterans 
when raising an adequate objection in front of the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals). 
 133. See id. (explaining that the presumption of competence “almost entirely 
insulates the VA’s choice of medical examiners from review”). 
 134. See, e.g., Parks v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 581, 586 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (applying 
the presumption of competence although the veteran had raised a general 
expression of concern before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals). 
 135. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(adopting the presumption of competence rather than weighing the relative 
qualifications of two competing experts). 
 136. But see Bruner v. Wilkie, 2018 WL 1750944, at *2 (Vet. App. April 12, 
2018) (refusing to extend the presumption of competence to the adequacy of an 
examiner’s opinion). 
 137. See, e.g., Brief of Law School Veterans Clinics and Attorneys as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17–19, Mathis v. 
McDonald, No. 16-677 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2016) (putting forward evidence that VA 
medical examinations are often unreliable). 
FOR HIM WHO SHALL HAVE BORNE THE BATTLE 599 
B. The Presumption of Competence Protects Incompetent Medical 
Examiners 
One of the biggest problems with categorically presuming the 
competence of veterans’ medical examiners is that VA medical 
examiners—emphatically—are not categorically competent.138 
One study, for example, picked a random sample of 100 Veteran’s 
Court opinions and then picked within that sample the cases 
where the court actually reviewed a medical examiner’s opinion.139 
Among these cases, the court held 76 percent of the time that the 
examiner’s opinion was either wrong or inaccurate.140 That is not 
an isolated finding. Here is a report summarizing the VA’s 
extensive history of procedural error: 
Ultimately, the best measure of how well the [VA] system is 
performing is the accuracy of the decision making . . . . [T]he 
small sample of cases appealed to the [Veterans’ Court of 
Appeals] suggests agency errors are frequent, as the [court] 
affirms fewer than 35% of the [VA’s] decisions that it addresses 
on the merits. On a wider scale, VA’s Office of Inspector General 
released a report in March 2009 concluding that VA’s internal 
quality control system was under-reporting errors, and 
estimated that 203,000 of the 882,000 (24%) compensation 
claims decided over a one-year period contained non-technical 
errors that affected the amount of benefits paid. This report 
followed a previous one that found disturbing variances in the 
treatment of claims between different [VA offices], and a 2000 
GAO [Government Accounting Office] report stating that 
stricter quality review measures implemented in 1999 showed 
that initial [VA] decisions were correct only 68% of the time. 
Thus, there is ample reason to be concerned about how well the 
current VA adjudication process works.141  
                                                                                                     
 138. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 982–83 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Reyna, J., concurring) (describing the process by which the VA picks its 
examiners as “largely unknown” and noting the agency’s preference for generalist 
examiners as opposed to specialists). 
 139. Brief of Law School Veterans Clinics and Attorneys as Amici Curiae in 
Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17–19, Mathis v. McDonald, No. 
16-677 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2016) (putting forward the findings of the study). 
 140. Id. 
 141. James D. Ridgeway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years 
Later: Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 251, 270 (2010). 
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Besides the numbers, there is also plenty of anecdotal evidence 
to support the proposition that the VA does not routinely pick 
competent medical examiners.142 Two examples come to mind 
immediately. 
The first example is about a veteran named Charles Gatlin.143 
Gatlin suffered a brain injury from a car bomb in Iraq and was 
discharged from the Army with a 70 percent disability rating.144 
But on returning home, he visited a medical office where a 
psychologist inexplicably reduced his disability rating to thirty 
percent after a brief exam.145 Why did the psychologist do this? 
Because the psychologist did not know what he was doing.146 
According to the VA’s own regulations, the psychologist was 
unqualified to diagnose traumatic brain injuries—only 
psychiatrists, physiatrists, neurologists could perform those kinds 
of examinations.147 The good news is that Gatlin did eventually 
receive his benefits.148 The bad news is that it took three years and 
put significant pressure on his life and marriage.149 The worse 
news is that Gatlin was not the only veteran to receive an 
unqualified brain examination—not even close.150 In 2014, the VA 
admitted that over the course of seven years, unqualified 
examiners performed 24,000 traumatic brain injury evaluations.151 
Let the record reflect: The Federal Circuit presumes all medical 
examiners competence—but at least 24,000 of them have given 
incompetent brain exams.152  
                                                                                                     
 142. See, e.g., Sarah Kolinovsky, VA Admits 25,000 Veterans Received 
Improper Brain Injury Screening, ABC NEWS (June 9, 2016, 4:48PM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/va-admits-25000-veterans-received-improper-brain-
injury/story?id=39734423 (reporting that over the course of seven years 
incompetent VA medical examiners perform 24,000 brain exams) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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The second example involves an anesthesiologist.153 Dr. 
Richard Krugman had not treated a patient in nearly ten years.154 
After accepting a job as a VA medical examiner, he went through 
an online training course that lasted a week and received no 
in- person training.155 When asked to perform a medical evaluation, 
he refused on grounds that he was unqualified.156 The VA fired Dr. 
Krugman, due at least in part to his refusal.157 Let the record 
reflect: The Federal Circuit presumes all medical examiners 
competent—but at least one of them refused to do a job on grounds 
of incompetence and was fired over it.158  
C. The Presumption of Competence Contravenes Veterans’ Benefits 
Statutes 
Already this Note has established that the veterans’ disability 
program is a non-adversarial, solicitous affair organized in the 
veteran’s favor.159 And it has established also that the presumption 
of competence adds to that non-adversarial affair an adversarial 
burden—that veterans affirmatively object to their examiner’s 
qualifications.160 What, then, is the legal consequence?  
The Supreme Court answered that question in 2000 with Sims 
v. Apfel.161 Admittedly, Sims was about Social Security benefits, 
not veterans’ disability benefits, but the case is relevant for the 
principle it sets forward: 
                                                                                                     
 153. Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1355 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting Krugman v. Dep’t of Veterans 
Affairs, 645 Fed. Appx. 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2016) in support of Mr. Mathis’s argument 
that “the presumption of regularity should not have been applied to the VA and 
its outside contractors’ processing of selecting examiners”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011) (describing the VA 
disability program as one “designed to function . . . with a high degree of 
informality and solicitude for the claimant” (citations omitted)). 
 160. See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (establishing 
the presumption of medical examiner competence). 
 161. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 109–10 (2000) (prohibiting adversarial 
burdens such as issue exhaustion in non-adversarial schemes). 
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[T]he desirability of a court imposing a requirement of issue 
exhaustion depends on the degree to which the analogy to 
normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular 
administrative proceeding . . . . [W]here . . . an administrative 
proceeding is not adversarial, we think the reasons for a court 
to require issue exhaustion are much weaker.162 
The paraphrased version of the Court’s reasoning is that 
adversarial burdens do not belong in non-adversarial 
proceedings—particularly burdens such as issue exhaustion.163 
That reasoning applies squarely here given that the presumption 
of competence is, at bottom, a rule of issue exhaustion—it exhausts 
in some circumstances the veteran’s right to appeal.164 By imposing 
that rule against veterans, the court has undermined the 
solicitous, pro-claimant nature of the veterans’ disability 
statutes.165  
D. The Presumption of Competence Violates the Fifth Amendment 
Because the presumption of competence undermines the 
non- adversarial VA disability program, it also violates the Fifth 
Amendment.166 That Amendment prohibits the state from taking 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”167 As the 
Supreme Court has long recognized, the Amendment’s protections 
                                                                                                     
 162. Id. (citations omitted). 
 163. See id. (“The differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more 
pronounced than in Social Security proceedings.”). 
 164. See Rizzo, 580 F.3d at 1291 (requiring veterans to challenge the 
qualifications of their medical examiner affirmatively, les they lose the right to 
challenge them on appeal). 
 165. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[The Presumption’s] application 
has resulted in a process that is inconsistent with the Congressional imperative 
that the veterans' disability process be non-adversarial, and that the VA bears an 
affirmative duty to assist the veteran.”). 
 166. See id. at 1356 (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“Since the presumption of competence leaves veterans with no way to 
effectively challenge the nexus between the VA examiners’ qualifications and 
their opinions, due process afforded other individuals in other legal disciplines is 
not extended to veterans.”). 
 167. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”). 
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against the taking of property extend to certain government 
benefits.168 To determine whether a government benefit counts as 
a constitutionally protected property interest, courts ask whether 
the claimant has a mere “abstract need or desire” for the benefits 
or, on the other hand, a “legitimate entitlement” to them.169 In past 
decisions, the Federal Circuit has recognized that veterans do have 
a legitimate entitlement to disability benefits.170 And in a 2009 
decision, the court decided that a veteran’s entitlement to benefits 
begins even before the benefits have been awarded—they begin as 
soon as the veteran submits an application.171 Under these 
decisions, the Federal Circuit should have held that the 
presumption of competence contravened the Fifth Amendment.172  
That constitutional problem combined with the others—the 
obscured review; the incompetent examiners; the undermined 
disability scheme—warrant overturning the presumption of 
competence. As the next section explains, some members of the 
Federal Circuit agree with that proposition.   
IV. The Split 
Over the past three years, a faction has formed of several 
Federal Circuit judges dedicated to overturning the presumption 
of competence.173 Although the judges represent the minority of the 
court, their opposition signals a flash of recognition, an impending 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (stating that 
disability benefits can be a property interest protected under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
 169. See Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1297 (discussing Supreme 
Court precedent requiring a legitimate entitlement over an abstract need or 
unilateral expectation) (citations omitted). 
 170. See id. at 1297 (noting that veterans’ disability statutes provide “an 
absolute right of benefits to qualified individuals”). 
 171. See id. at 1298 (“A veteran is entitled to disability benefits upon a 
showing that he meets the eligibility requirements . . . . We conclude that such 
entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 172. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1356 (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (demonstrating the presumption of competence raises a due 
process problem). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 1353 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (admonishing the court over the presumption of competence). 
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realization, that the presumption of competence deserves no place 
in veterans’ disability law.174 The ferocity of their opposition was 
on full display in a 2009 case about a United States Air Force 
veteran.175 Because that case both illustrates the danger of the 
presumption and also provides a useful map of the court’s 
diverging opinions, this Section tells of what happened in that case 
during each of its three constituent phases.  
A. First Stage: The Board of Veterans’ Appeals 
The case began in in the fall of 2009, one month after veteran 
Freddie Mathis had been diagnosed with a rare pulmonary 
condition called Sarcoidosis.176 Cells had inflamed on the linings of 
Mathis’ lungs,177 forming scars that labored his breathing and 
caused episodes of fatigue and sent him at one point to the 
emergency room.178 No one disputed that Mathis had 
Sarcoidosis.179 The only question was whether his Sarcoidosis 
manifested during service.180 The whole case turned on when he 
                                                                                                     
 174. See id. (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The 
presumption, that the Veterans Administration ordinarily and routinely selects 
competent medical examiners as a matter of due course, was created void of any 
evidentiary basis.”). 
 175. See id. at 1353–54 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (telling Mathis’s story, when the presumption of competence failed). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Pulmonary Sarcoidosis, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/healthlibrary/conditions/respiratory_disorders
/pulmonary_sarcoidosis_85,P01325 (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (“Sarcoidosis in 
the lungs is called pulmonary sarcoidosis. It causes small lumps of inflammatory 
cells in the lungs. These lumps are called granulomas and can affect how the 
lungs work . . . . [I]f they don’t heal, the lung tissue can remain inflamed and 
become scarred and stiff.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 178. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-7094) (describing Mathis’ symptoms and explaining that 
Mathis’ trip to the emergency room was the result of these symptoms). 
 179. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (providing the opinion of Mathis’ 
medical examiner, who concedes that Mathis does at least have Sarcoidosis). 
 180. See id. at 1353 n.1 (“[A]s in this case, the service connection issue is often 
dispositive.”) (citations omitted). 
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contracted it.181 Mathis believed that he developed it in the late 
1990’s, several years before he retired.182 He filed for benefits.183  
Six months later, the VA denied his claim.184 Mathis appealed 
to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, where his case languished.185 As 
part of that appeal, he testified before a review board that his 
symptoms began during service: The fatigue, the weakness, the 
shortness of breath.186 He testified that he was treated for these 
symptoms while serving and that the cause of his condition may 
have been environmental exposure while he was stationed in 
Italy.187 His ex-wife testified as well, backing up what he said.188 
He submitted statements from two fellow service members who 
confirmed that his heavy breathing began in the late 1990’s, before 
he retired.189  
More years passed, and it was now 2012.190 The VA requested 
a medical opinion from a doctor about whom little was known.191 
His name was Dr. John Dudek, and he did not examine Mathis.192 
He did not perform tests.193 He determined from Mathis’s claim 
file, his hearing transcript, and lay statements that Mathis’ 
Sarcoidosis probably did not develop while he was serving.194 
Dudek made this determination in an opinion spanning two 
                                                                                                     
 181. See id. (noting that the outcome of the case on the question of service 
connection). 
 182. Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 969–70 (describing Mathis’ appeal before the Board as 
beginning in March 2010 ending in June 2013).  
 186. Id. at 969. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
 189. See id. (“Mathis submitted two statements from veterans 
who . . . described his shortness of breath during his active service and since that 
time.”). 
 190. See id. (stating that the VA obtained Dr. John K. Dudek’s medical 
opinion in 2012). 
 191. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1354 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“The record indicated merely that the examiner was a ‘staff 
physician.’”) (citations omitted). 
 192. See Mathis, 643 Fed. Appx. at 969 (stating Dr. Dudek reviewed Mathis’s 
claims file but did not examine Mattis). 
 193. See id. (stating Dr. Dudek did not perform any tests).  
 194. See id. (describing Dr. Dudek’s conclusion). 
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paragraphs, a whopping six sentences.195 The opinion made no 
reference to medical authority and included little in the way of 
actual reasoning.196 Sentence number five of the opinion he 
dedicated to the following specious argument: “Had veteran had 
significant breathing issues post service, one can assume he would 
have sought medical care, and a simple CXR would have been 
ordered.”197  
The opinion assumed, in other words, that because Mathis did 
not seek treatment in the year immediately following service, that 
he must not have had symptoms in that year following service.198 
Based on the opinion, the Appeals Board denied Mathis’ claim for 
benefits.199  
                                                                                                     
 195. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1354 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). Dr. Dudek’s opinion in its entirety:  
While veteran claims to have had some pulmonary symptoms 
while in service, there is nothing to support that they were 
related to sarcoidosis. I am not doubting the validity of the 
letters written by Mr. Jackson and Mr. Adams stating that 
veteran had some breathing issues while in service. He may 
very well have had such issues. But the Sarcoidosis was 
diagnosed 7 years after service. There is nothing to indicate that 
it existed within one year of service. Had veteran had significant 
breathing issues post service, one can assume he would have 
sought medical care, and a simple CXR would have been 
ordered.  
As the present lack of documentation exists, it would be an 
extreme stretch, and unreasonable, to opine that veteran's 
sarcoidosis existed with one year of service. 
 196. See id. (discussing Mathis’s argument that the report contained 
inadequate analysis and minimal effort given that the examiner cited no medical 
authorities). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. (“As the present lack of documentation exists, it would have been 
an extreme stretch, and unreasonable, to opine that veteran’s sarcoidosis existed 
within one year of service.”). 
 199. See Mathis, 643 Fed. Appx. at 970 (describing the Board’s findings). 
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B. Second Stage: The Veterans Court 
Mathis appealed to the Veterans Court,200 where he argued 
that Dr. Dudek’s opinion afforded the VA an inadequate basis to 
deny his claim.201 For one thing, the VA had failed to establish Dr. 
Dudek’s credentials.202 Mathis was suffering from a complex 
disease, the assessment of which (arguably) would have required 
specialized training in the field of pulmonology.203 But the VA did 
not prove that Dr. Dudek had any specialized training in that field; 
nor did it prove that Dr. Dudek had enough training to determine 
accurately when a case of Sarcoidosis began.204 Remember: The 
examiner’s job is to decide not only whether a veteran has a disease 
but also when it started.205 Here, Dr. Dudek needed to determine 
if Mathis had contracted Sarcoidosis before 2002—ten years 
earlier.206 Whether Dr. Dudek had the qualifications to make that 
sort of determination is a mystery.207 The record showed merely 
that he was a staff physician who (maybe) specialized in family 
practice.208 
                                                                                                     
 200. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1353 n.1 (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“[T]he veteran may appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals 
(the ‘Board’), and then the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
(the ‘Veterans Court’), this court, and the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
 201. See Mathis, 643 Fed. Appx. at 970 (stating that the Veterans Court relied 
on an inadequate medical opinion instead of a proper medical examination). 
 202. See id. (“Mathis argued to the court that: . . . the VA failed to establish 
that the examiner was competent to provide an opinion in this case.”). 
 203. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1354 (“Mr. Mathis also objected to the VA's 
failure to establish that the examiner was ‘qualified to offer an expert opinion’ on 
the issue, which he argued required ‘specialized knowledge, training or 
experience in the field of pulmonology.’”) (citations omitted). 
 204. See id. (“The record indicated merely that the examiner was a ‘staff 
physician.’”) (citations omitted). 
 205. See Mathis, 643 Fed. Appx. at 970 (“[E]ntitlement to service connection 
for a particular disorder requires (1) evidence of the existence of a current 
disorder, and (2) evidence that the disorder resulted from a disease or injury 
incurred in or aggravated during service.”). 
 206. See id. at 969 (stating that Mathis resigned from the Air Force in 2002 
and that the VA appointed Dr. Dudek to examine his claim in 2012). 
 207. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that the VA presumes is has 
properly chosen a qualified person). 
 208. See id. at 1354 (“The record indicated merely that the examiner was a 
‘staff physician.’”) (citations omitted); id. at 1354 n.1 (“The briefing in this case 
indicates that Mr. Mathis believes that the examiner was a family practice doctor, 
608 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 577 (2019) 
Another problem was Dr. Dudek’s opinion itself, it being 
totally devoid of any reference to medical literature and serious 
adult-level reasoning.209 Take, for example, Dr. Dudek’s 
assumption that because Mathis failed to visit a doctor within one 
year of service he must therefore not have had any symptoms 
during that year. What the opinion failed to consider was that 
Mathis was a tough member of the military who perhaps would not 
have been alarmed by the early symptoms of Sarcoidosis, with its 
rather mild onset; that Mathis perhaps was breathing heavily and 
experiencing episodes of fatigue, but being a hardened soldier, did 
not consider these reasons to see a doctor.210 Mathis provided 
medical analysis of his own showing a few key facts about 
Sarcoidosis: (1) that there are multiple forms of the disease;211 
(2) that some forms of the disease manifest symptoms early while 
others develop symptoms more slowly, more insidiously;212 and 
(3) that Sarcoidosis sometimes takes up to a year to diagnose, even 
when a patient is seeking continuous treatment from an 
experienced practitioner.213 Mathis argued that Dr. Dudek ignored 
these facts in coming to his conclusion.214 
                                                                                                     
but support for this is not in the record.”) (citations omitted). 
 209. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“Mathis argued to the court that: . . . [T]he Board erred in relying on an 
inadequate VA examiner opinion . . . .”). 
 210. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 2015-7094) (“Mr. Mathis testified that his wife would nag 
him to see a physician. Nonetheless, Mr. Mathis stubbornly refused to seek 
medical attention, brushing-off his symptoms as long as possible.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 211. See id. at 38–39 (“[T]here are several different types of sarcoidosis . . . .” 
(citing DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1668 (32d ed. 2012))). 
 212. See id. (explaining that one type of Sarcoidosis is “characterized by a slow 
and gradual development of symptoms” (citing DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MED. 
DICTIONARY 1668 (32d ed. 2012))). 
 213. See id. (“[D]ue to the non-specific nature of pulmonary symptoms, many 
physicians would not suspect sarcoidosis at its early phase and thus would not 
immediately order a chest x-ray.” (citing 2 HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL 
MED. 2136 (17th ed. 2008))); id. at 29 n.21 (“This treatise notes that it may take 
up to one-year to confirm a diagnosis of sarcoidosis. But this statement assumes 
that the patient has continuously sought medical attention. The timeline would 
obviously be longer if the patient did not seek continuous treatment.” (citing 2 
HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MED. 2136 (17th ed. 2008))). 
 214. See id. (stating that Dr. Dukek provided no support for his conclusory 
opinion based on false assumptions). 
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But the Veterans’ Court rejected Mathis’ arguments.215 It 
assumed the correctness of Dr. Dudek’s opinion without knowing 
anything about him.216 It made no effort to discover his credentials 
or to make sense of his sparse reasoning.217 It presumed his 
competency and threw the burden on Mathis of showing 
otherwise.218 Mathis could have overcome this presumption only by 
offering specific objections at the first stage of the appeal—before 
the Appeals Board.219 But because Mathis was not a lawyer—
merely a United States veteran, seven years removed from 
twenty- two years of service, with trouble breathing—he failed to 
make the objections and lost his case. 220 
C. Third Stage: The Federal Circuit 
Mathis appealed to a three judge panel of the Federal Circuit, 
which had no choice but to but to affirm, it being bound by the 
presumption of competence.221 Mathis petitioned for rehearing en 
banc in hopes of convincing the full bench to disavow the 
presumption.222 The court denied the petition with five judges 
                                                                                                     
 215. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The VA denied Mr. Mathis’s claim 
for benefits after reviewing the examiner’s opinion and the Board affirmed.”) 
 216. See id. (“The record indicated merely that the examiner was a ‘staff 
physician.’”) (citations omitted). 
 217. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(summarizing the findings of the Veterans’ court: That the Board of appeals was 
within its right to presume the competency of Mathis’s examiner, and the burden 
of showing otherwise rested with Mathis). 
 218. See id. (“[T]he Veterans Court noted that Mathis recognized legal 
authority that placed the burden on the claimant to challenge the competency of 
VA medical examiners.”). 
 219. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1357 (“Even if a veteran objects to an examiner’s 
competence before the Board, a veteran must make a ‘specific’ objection to an 
examiner’s competence—not merely a ‘general’ one—before the Board will review 
the examiner's competence.”) (citations omitted). 
 220. See Mathis, 643 Fed. Appx. at 971 (“The Veterans Court held that the 
mere fact that the VA examiner was not a pulmonologist did not, by itself, render 
the opinion inadequate. Therefore, it affirmed.”). 
 221. See id. at 975 (“We need not—and cannot—resolve this debate. 
We . . . are bound by clear precedent to presume that Dr. Dudek was competent 
to render the opinion he did.”). 
 222. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“A petition for 
rehearing en banc was filed by claimant-appellant.”). 
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dissenting.223 It is worth pausing here to identify the points of 
disagreement between the judges. 
1. The Fight in the Federal Circuit 
One of the chief difficulties with analyzing the presumption of 
competence is that some of its most insidious reasoning lives in 
mounds of abstruse case law. This is an area of law filled with 
confusing Federal Circuit opinions and with opinions from 
Veterans’ Court and the Board of Appeals that are even more 
confusing.224 The Board decisions are particularly dense. Many of 
them do not even have captions.225 One especially troubling opinion 
referenced supra is called simply: “No. 1452787.”226 That title of 
seven innocuous digits serves to obscure how dangerous the 
opinion is. The lack of a caption makes the opinion seem ordinary, 
routine. And because the case law is confusing, and because the 
really dangerous reasoning hides in title-less opinions, the points 
of disagreement between the judges of the Federal Circuit can be 
difficult to identify.  
By all appearances, the most prominent voice in the 
keep-the-presumption-of-competence camp is Judge Todd Hughes 
who wrote a concurring opinion to the order denying Mathis’ 
petition for re-hearing.227 He believes that the concerns over the 
presumption of competence are overstated and fears that 
overturning it would create an unmanageable administrative 
burden for the VA:  
The VA provides over 1 million disability evaluations yearly and 
in 2015 alone, the Veterans Health Administration completed 
2,899,593 individual disability benefits questionnaires and/or 
disability examination templates. The dissent has provided no 
                                                                                                     
 223. See id. at 1353 (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc) (dissenting with judges Newman and Wallach joining); id. at 1360 (Stoll, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (dissenting with Judges 
Newman, Moore, and Wallach joining).  
 224. See Mathis v. McDonald, 643 Fed. Appx. 968, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(discussing numerous cases regarding the presumption of competence). 
 225. See id. at n.6 (citing numerous caption-less cases). 
 226. No. 1452787, 2014 WL 7740599 at *8 (Bd. Vet. App. Dec. 1, 2014).  
 227. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Hughes, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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guidance as to how the elimination of this limited presumption 
would work with regard to the millions of disability evaluations 
that have already been provided and form the basis for the 
continuing evaluation of the millions of pending claims for 
benefits.228 
Heading up the effort to undue the Presumption of 
Competence is Judge Jimmie Reyna,229 whose dissent from the 
denial for re-hearing is a rhetorical masterpiece. Here is the 
opening paragraph: 
In declining to undertake an en banc review, the court leaves in 
place a judicially created evidentiary presumption that in 
application denies due process to veterans seeking disability 
benefits. The presumption, that the Veterans Administration 
ordinarily and routinely selects competent medical examiners 
as a matter of due course, was created void of any evidentiary 
basis. Its application has resulted in a process that is 
inconsistent with the Congressional imperative that the 
veterans' disability process be non-adversarial, and that the VA 
bears an affirmative duty to assist the veteran. In the face of 
these circumstances, the government's cries concerning its 
administrative burdens do not resonate. I dissent . . . .230 
This paper will spend its third Part comparing the approaches 
of these two judges—Hughes and Reyna. But it is worth 
mentioning that these are not the only important voices in the 
presumption of competence debate. Following his denial for 
re- hearing, Freddie Mathis petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari.231 The Court denied the petition, but from the denial, 
Justice Gorsuch dissented. 232 He argued that the Supreme Court 
should take on the presumption of competence:  
Now, you might wonder if our intervention is needed to remedy 
the problem. After all, a number of thoughtful colleagues on the 
Federal Circuit have begun to question the presumption's 
propriety. And this may well mean the presumption's days are 
numbered. But I would not wait in hope. The issue is of much 
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 229. See Mathis, 834 F.3d at 1353 (dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 230. Id.  
 231. See generally Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1994 (2017).  
 232. See id. at 1995 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
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significance to many today and, respectfully, it is worthy of this 
Court's attention.233 
 Justice Sotomayor also attached a statement to the denial of 
certiorari.234 She agreed that the Court should review the presumption, 
but believed for procedural reasons that Mathis was the wrong case to 
decide the issue.235  
2. The Lesson of Mathis v. McDonald 
Here things stand. Five judges of the Federal Circuit and 
perhaps two members of the Supreme Court are prepared to do 
away with the presumption of competence for good. Meanwhile, a 
majority of the Federal Circuit remains obstinately opposed. In 
some respects, their hesitancy is understandable. Undoing the 
presumption of competence raises a host of questions, e.g., what 
does the court replace it with?236 What will the administrative 
burden look like?237 What will the VA have to do to qualify its 
examiners, if the burden is on them?238  
On the other hand, the Presumption of Competence occupies 
some pretty indefensible terrain.239 It places a heavy 
adversarial- style burden into a thoroughly non-adversarial 
program and in doing so reduces the likelihood that veterans will 
receive the benefits to which they are entitled under the law.240 
Mathis shows the problem in a couple ways.  
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 234. Id. at 1994 (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
 235. See id. at 1995 (“Full review would require a petition . . . from a case in 
which the VA denied a veteran benefits after declining to provide the medical 
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 236. See infra Part 5. 
 237. See infra Part 5. 
 238. See infra Part 5. 
 239. See Mathis v. McDonald, 834 F.3d at 1353 (Reyna, J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In declining to undertake an en banc review, 
the court leaves in place a judicially created evidentiary presumption that in 
application denies due process to veterans seeking disability benefits.”). 
 240. See id. at 1356 (“Yet, a veteran's ability to challenge an examiner’s 
competency is limited because the VA does not by default disclose any information 
about the examiner's qualifications. Veterans are unable to confront examiners 
through voir dire, cross-examination, or interrogatories.”) (citations omitted). 
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First, it shows the absurdity of placing the burden on veterans 
to affirmatively challenge their examiners’ competence. Logic 
would seem to dictate that if the VA wanted to deny Mathis’ claim 
for benefits, and if it wanted to do so based on an expert medical 
examiner’s opinion, the burden should have fallen to it of 
establishing the examiner’s qualifications—the same way that 
during a criminal trial, the burden of qualifying a witness for the 
prosecution falls on the prosecution; the same way that during a 
civil trial the burden of qualifying a witness for the defense falls 
on the defense.241 After all, the VA’s job was to help Mathis.242 The 
burden of providing a competent medical examination was 
theirs.243 The duty of developing Mathis’ claim was on them.244 So 
why then did that fundamental rule of evidence—that the burden 
of qualifying a witness rests with the party who wants to rely on 
the witness—which applies in adversarial disputes, such as 
criminal trials, contract suits, and tort cases, not apply to Mathis’ 
non-adversarial dispute in the totally solicitous VA disability 
scheme? Why did Mathis carry a tougher burden than a litigant in 
a tort trial? 
Second, the case shows how difficult the presumption of 
competence makes the review of a medical examiner’s opinion. 
Here, the reviewing courts knew nothing of Dr. Dudek’s 
credentials; about his reasoning, they knew only what he conveyed 
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within his six-sentence opinion.245 Thus, when the reviewing 
courts “reviewed” Dr. Dudek’s opinion, they were not actually 
reviewing anything at all; they were mechanically applying the 
presumption of competence without giving any thought as to 
whether Dr. Dudek was qualified or his opinion correct.246 When 
Congress overhauled the veterans review scheme so as to create a 
“[C]ompletely ex-parte system of adjudication,”247 this cannot be 
what it had in mind.  
The Federal Circuit got it wrong in a big way. The 
presumption of medical examiner competence is a bad fit to the 
uniquely pro-claimant, non-adversarial, paternalistic veterans’ 
disability scheme. What this note will do from here on is explain 
how the court should go about getting rid of it.  
V. The Solution 
The presumption of competence survives for its supposed 
practicality. As Judge Hughes pointed out in his concurrence to 
Mathis, getting rid of the presumption of competence raises a host 
of questions: 
The dissent has provided no guidance as to how the elimination 
of this limited presumption would work with regard to the 
millions of disability evaluations that have already been 
provided and form the basis for the continuing evaluation of the 
millions of pending claims for benefits. Would the Secretary be 
required to provide an affidavit or some other supporting 
evidence of the examiner’s competence before the Regional 
Office or the Board could rely on that examination report? 
Would the Secretary have to appoint a specialist for each 
particular ailment a veteran alleges, as Mathis implies would 
be necessary? If so, that will create an incredible burden and 
may impair the operations of the VA, a result that will 
negatively impact veterans. Consequently, this court should not 
revise a procedure that is one small piece of a very complicated 
and long process, especially in a case that does not demonstrate 
a problem with the use of that procedure.248 
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On the one hand, it sounds a bit like Judge Hughes is 
supporting his interpretation of the law on the basis of a policy 
concern. That is problematic in itself, but it is even more 
problematic when you consider that his policy concern is largely 
unfounded. Judge Reyna proposes getting rid of the presumption 
of competence for good, and he proposes a way of doing so that 
would impose minimal administrative burden: 
Eliminating the presumption will require the VA to provide the 
Board with evidence that an examiner “is qualified through 
education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, 
statements, or opinions” on the issue that the examiner is 
testifying about. The VA could meet this requirement by 
attaching an examiner's curriculum vitae (CV) to her report, 
and, if necessary, having her state in her report why she is 
qualified.249 
In other words, courts should treat VA medical examiners the 
same way that they treat all other experts—meaning that if the 
VA would like to rely on an expert’s opinion, it must first lay a 
foundation. That way the courts will have actual information on 
review to review. Rather than imposing a steep administrative 
burden, it would merely require that VA examiners attach to their 
reports a brief copy of their credentials and perhaps a statement 
as to why they are qualified to examine a particular veteran.  
I am not sure there has ever been a legal problem so 
gargantuan that could be so easily fixed.  
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